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ABSTRACT
Classification of Malware Models
by Akriti Sethi
Automatically classifying similar malware families is a challenging problem. In
this research, we attempt to classify malware families by applying machine learning
to machine learning models. Specifically, we train hidden Markov models (HMM) for
each malware family in our dataset. The resulting models are then compared in two
ways. First, we treat the HMM matrices as images and experiment with convolutional
neural networks (CNN) for image classification. Second, we apply support vector
machines (SVM) to classify the HMMs. We analyze the results and discuss the relative
advantages and disadvantages of each approach.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Malware is software that is developed for the purpose of causing damage to a
computer system, client, server or computer network, without the consent of the
user [9]. The damage is done by the malware once it reaches the target’s computer.
The malware can take the form of scripts, executable codes and so on. The malware
perform tasks with purpose of stealing important information from the target computer
or it could spread from one file to the other and infect the entire computer [10]. It can
also ask users critical information, including financial specifics, or even crash the hard
disk. Malware not only focuses on a narrow scope but includes worms, ransomware,
trojan horses, spyware and computer viruses. An important step in protecting the
users and preventing any malicious activities from happening is to recognize the
malware and eliminate it.
In May of 2017, a worldwide cyber attack took place known as the WannaCry
ransomware attack. It was caused by the WannaCry ransomware cryptoworm [11].
The main victims of this attack were computers running the Microsoft Windows
operating system. It attacked the target system by encrypting the data and in turn
demanded a huge amount of payment in the form of bitcoins from its user. The
attack circulated via EternalBlue, which was an exploit, a piece of software which took
advantage of a bug to cause unanticipated behavior of computer software, created by
the US National Security Agency (NSA) for systems using older versions of Windows.
This was released by The Shadow Brokers, a hacker group, some months prior to
the attack [11]. The impact of the attack was huge with its major victim being the
National Health Service hospitals in Scotland and England as nearly 70,000 devices,
comprising of MRI scanners, refrigerators storing blood and computers were affected.
Another computer worm which targeted users was the multi-platform worm by
1

the name Koobface. It targets users of social networking websites such as Twitter
and Facebook. Although it does not gather any important financial data, it gathers
login information for these websites. The Koobface worm actively infects the PC and
then it transmits itself intentionally via social networking sites. It uses the internet
cookies in order to track what sites a user is a member of [12]. Once known, it accesses
the users social network account and sends messages pertaining to Koobface on the
website. Its threat consists of several component malware files which work in union
to create and sustain the Koobface botnet [12]. Each unit performs a specific task
to help the Koobface botnet function. Such a model enables Koobface to modernize
its existing components on an already affected system, stop improving non-working
modules or add new ones.
Due to the examples presented above, we know that malware pose a significant
threat and it is growing every day at a very fast speed. New methods to escape
the detection of malware are becoming the prime focus of malware developers. The
creation of malware has become a very simple task these days because of the abundance
of malware development kits and generation of viruses using metamorphic generators.
Thus, different ways of analysis of malware is an important research area with a focus
on reducing the problems caused by malware.
Malware samples belonging to a specific family will exhibit similar characteristics
and behavior. The standard method of detecting malware relies on signatures, which
are typically sequences of bits found in a specific malware sample. However, such an
approach is ineffective against advanced forms of malware, or zero-day malware, i.e.,
malware that has not been previously detected, and for which no signature currently
exists. And, in any case, signature detection is inefficient, due to the vast number of
malware samples in existence. Hence, there is considerable recent research focused
on trying to find efficient and effective means of detecting all samples belonging to a
2

particular malware family. Machine learning techniques have proven extremely useful
in this research. For example, classification based on hidden Markov model (HMM)
scores [13] has shown to be useful for classifying malware samples into their respective
families.
In this research, we will analyze a class of machine learning models to determine
whether they can be used to directly provide information about the underlying malware
families, as opposed to simply classifying samples based on scores generated by the
models [14]. Specifically, we will train an HMM for each family in a large and diverse
malware dataset. Then we will classify the resulting models and analyze these to
determine whether the groupings represent families with common characteristics. We
will also extend this analysis to the context of zero-day malware, i.e., we will train
HMMs from new malware samples and try to predict the malware family to which
they most closely match. If successful, this technique will greatly speed up the process
of analyzing new malware families.
The report is structured in the following manner: Chapter 2 gives an overview of
malware and the various types of malware, along with their detection techniques. It
also gives an overview about the previous work done in the detection of malware. A
brief introduction about Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) and Support Vector
Machine (SVM) is also given in this chapter. Chapter 3 talks about the implementation
and the steps followed to complete this project. Chapter 4 highlights the experiments
performed and discusses what the results imply. Chapter 5 gives the conclusion and
provides pointers towards related future work.

3

CHAPTER 2
Background
2.1

Malware
As mentioned in Chapter 1, malware is a software developed with the intent of

performing malicious activities on a computer. The malware cause disruption of the
normal functioning of the target’s computer. It may be because of some code or script
which may be written with the purpose of stealing confidential information or to cause
the hard drive of the target to crash. Malware include virus, worms, adware, trojan
horse and spyware.
Figure 1 depicts at what rates are malware increasing day by day. The 𝑥 axis
depicts the year in which the number of malware is recorded and the 𝑦 axis depicts
the number of malware generated in that particular year. As we can see in the figure,
the number of malware increased by nearly 110 million from 2017 to 2018.

Figure 1: Growth Rate of Malware [3]
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2.1.1

Virus

A virus is one of the most typical and commonly found type of malware. It
spreads by executing itself and infecting other files on the target’s computer. The
virus spreads by duplicating, i.e., it joins itself to various other executables to spread
the infection. It can reside anywhere and hide itself in hidden folders, files containing
data or even the boot sector [9]. A virus can prove to be very harmful when it resides
on the boot sector as it becomes activated at the time of the target’s computer starting.
Due to this, all antivirus starting after the system boots, may prove to be ineffective.
Also, since it starts even before any operating system security is enabled, it can prove
to be more harmful [15]. The virus can also block the antivirus from running on the
system. Other than living in the boot sector, it can also live in memory. The writers
of various virus keep updating their software in order to escape the various techniques
for virus detection. Some examples of computer viruses are Concept virus, Melissa
virus, Stuxnet and Pathogen [16].
2.1.1.1

Encrypted Virus

In most cases, antivirus software identify virus by looking up signatures of the
virus. A signature is a unique string of binary patterns or bits of a virus. The
signature of a virus is like a fingerprint which can be used in identifying and detecting
a particular virus. An approach to mask the virus signature is to inscribe it with
various other encryption keys [17]. Even though the encrypted virus makes the virus
difficult to detect, it is still possible to detect the encrypted signature. This technique
attempts to dodge the signature detection used by antivirus, but it is not a guaranteed
way. Even though there are so many changes to the virus, the decryptor loop is the
part that remains constant. Since the decryptor loop remains the same, the antivirus
exploits this fact for the detection of the virus [9]. Hence the next step for the virus
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writers is to change this constant part so that they can evade the signature based
detection of the antivirus.
2.1.1.2

Polymorphic Virus

As mentioned in Section 2.1.1.1, the antivirus software exploit the fact that the decryptor loop remains the same. Hence polymorphism solves the issue of non-decrypted
decryptor loop. In each phase, the decryptor loop is morphed [9]. A polymorphic
virus has a never ending number of variations of the decryptor loop. Detecting
polymorphic virus is very difficult since it is not possible to try all combinations of the
decryptor loop. Hence techniques such as emulation could be used for the detection
of polymorphic virus [18]. An example of a polymorphic virus is Tremor, which has
nearly as high as six billion combinations of decryptor loops [19].
2.1.1.3

Metamorphic Virus

In the case of a metamorphic virus, the virus writers try to make the sample not
detectable by the antivirus, by changing the appearance of the virus before it affects
any system. Due to even more changes to the virus, it becomes difficult to detect this
type. The morphed virus has a very different structure as compared to the original
virus.
2.1.2

Trojan

A Trojan is a malware which which performs a malicious task in the background,
but it appears to do an approved task to the user. A virus may appear similar to a
trojan horse but the major difference between the two is that Trojan does not duplicate
itself [14]. They appear as authentic programs that users may use mistaking them
for genuine programs. But once the user mistakens them for genuine programs and
executes it, the malware file performs unapproved activities in the background and
installs programs which can be harmful. These types of malware have the ability to
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destroy information on the hard drive, delete files or open a backdoor to the security
systems. Examples of trojan horse are Rootkit, Backdoor, Exploit, Trojan-dropper
and Netbus [20].
2.1.3

Worm

Another type of malware is the worm, which is very similar to virus as they also
reproduce themselves for spreading to other computers. The factor distinguishing
virus from worm is that unlike virus, worm have no requirement of a host file whereas
virus require a host file which is infected to spread [21]. Often worms are referred to
as standalone programs as they have no dependency on any other host file, unlike
virus, which need an infected host file to spread. The most common way by which
the worm spreads is on a network. It affects systems in the network on its way and
exhausts the network which in turn causes it to collapse. Examples of major virus are
Sobig, Storm worm, Code Red and Morris worm [22].
2.1.4

Spyware

It is a type of malware which once installed in the targets system can collect
the credentials of the user. This activity happens with the user not knowing. The
malware dissembles itself and, in the process, collects personal information, details
about the users credit card, data related to keystrokes and patterns related to the
users browsing [23]. Spywares do not spread by reproducing themselves like virus or
worms. Examples of spyware malware are BlazeFind, CoolWebSearch, Zwangi and
HuntBar [24].
2.2

Malware Detection Techniques
Malware have been known to mankind since a very long time and antivirus

focus on static detection techniques for the detection of malware. In static detection
techniques, the antivirus extracts fascinating features from the file, but it does not
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execute the file. Dynamic analysis runs the file in a sandbox because of which it
extracts the actual behavior of the file. These days malware writers are improving their
software in order to evade the standard signature detection techniques of antivirus.
Similarly, antivirus companies are also revamping their techniques for detection. This
section focuses on some of the static methods of malware detection which include
signature based detection, anomaly based detection and Hidden Markov Model based
detection.
2.2.1

Signature Based Detection

This is the most common and popular detection technique in antivirus software.
It is very common because the detection is simple and precise. It is a form of pattern
matching and is used to identify known malware. In this, the antivirus scanner looks
through each sample and searches for a particular pattern of bits. It depends on looking
out for a sequence of bits that in particular identifies any specific malware [25]. It is
an approach which considers the attack patterns as signatures and further compares
the signatures of known attacks to incoming attacks for detection. All the antivirus
programs have a database of signatures and this database is updated for new signatures
on a regular basis. The antivirus looks for a signature matching that in the database
and once the signature is found, that particular file is marked as a malware.
This detection technique works well but only on malware which are already
known. Because of this, a new signature cannot be detected. Known malware which
are morphed also cannot be detected as the morphed version of that malware would not
have been stored in the database. Also, the database holding the malware signatures
should be updated regularly as this would determine the accuracy of the antivirus. A
very easy way to dodge the signature based detection of malware is to use techniques
for code obfuscation [26].
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2.2.2

Anomaly Based Detection

Signature based detection techniques work well with known malware but the
problem of detecting unknown malware can be solved using anomaly based detection.
It is formed on the structure of the contents of the file [27]. The attributes are taken
to be the organization details of the file. In order to detect anomalous behavior
heuristic methods are implemented. It takes place in two phases: the training and
detection phase. In the first phase, the training phase, the model is trained with
normal behavior. Other than normal behavior, any behavior is considered malicious
behavior. The structural organization of the file or attributes are used as features
which are given to a machine learning algorithm to classify file structures into normal
or anomalous [28].
The main disadvantage of anomaly detection is knowing what is unusual and
what is normal. This technique could have many false positives and false negatives
depending on our definition of normal and abnormal behavior. Once a file is recognized
as malware, it is assessed and reviewed thoroughly in order to reduce the number of
false positives by determining if the file is actually malicious [27]. Anomaly detection
is usually combined with other detection techniques like signature based techniques,
in order to reduce the number of false positives [25].
2.2.3

Hidden Markov Based Detection

Hidden Markov Models (HMM) can prove to be a functional tool for the detection
of malware [19]. It is usually used for statistical pattern analysis. HMMs can not only
be applied to detection of malware, but also in recognition of human activity [29],
prediction of genes or speech recognition [30]. In the case of detection of malware from
benign samples, we train HMM models [31] and decide a threshold value of the score
which separates the malware samples from the benign ones. This section covers a
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short overview of HMMs and the problems which the HMM can solve. It also outlines
the solutions for the problems.
2.2.3.1

Introduction to HMM

HMM is a statistical model which has various states and transition probabilities
from and to various states. This is known as a Markov model [1]. In a Markov model,
the states and transitions are known to the user. Unlike Markov models, a Hidden
Markov Model has states which are not observable directly to the user. Hence it has
been coined with the name of Hidden Markov Model. HMM is a machine learning
technique and acts as a state machine. These can be used in protein modeling and
to know about the various types of software piracy detection [32]. Each state has
a probability distribution for the observation of a set of observation symbols. Each
transition between the various states have the same probabilities. In order to represent
a set of data, we can train the HMM using the observation sequence. If we want to
determine the probability of seeing such a sequence, we can match the observation
sequence against a trained HMM. When we get a high probability for the same, it
means that the observation sequence is very similar to the training sequences. Table 1
below highlights the standard notations used for HMM.
In order to represent a Hidden Markov Model, we need the 𝐴, 𝐵 and 𝜋 matrices.
Each of these matrices are row stochastic in nature. A matrix is said to be row
stochastic if the elements in each row satisfy the requirements of a discrete probability
distribution, that is, each element is between 0 and 1, and each row sums to 1. An
HMM is denoted as
𝜆 = (𝐴, 𝐵, 𝜋).
Figure 2 gives a generic overview of the Hidden Markov Model.
We can solve the following three major problem using HMMs.
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Table 1: Standard HMM Notation [1]
Notation

Description

𝑇
𝑁
𝑀
𝑄
𝑉
𝐴
𝐵
𝜋
𝑂

Length of the observation sequence
Number of states in the model
Number of distinct observation symbols
Distinct states of the Markov Model
Set of possible observations
State transition probability matrix, 𝑁 × 𝑁
Observation probability matrix, 𝑁 × 𝑀
Initial state distribution, 1 × 𝑁
Observation sequence

Figure 2: Generic View of Hidden Markov Model [1]
Problem 1: Given a model
𝜆 = (𝐴, 𝐵, 𝜋)
and an observation sequence 𝑂, we can find 𝑃 (𝑂|𝜆). In this case, we score an
observation sequence to see how well it fits a given model [1].
Problem 2: We are given a model
𝜆 = (𝐴, 𝐵, 𝜋)
11

and an observation sequence 𝑂, we could determine an optimal state sequence for the
Markov model. This means we can find out the most likely hidden state sequence of
the model [1].
Problem 3: If we are given 𝑂, 𝑁 , 𝑀 , we can find a model 𝜆 which gives the
maximum probability of that particular observation sequence 𝑂. This is the training
phase of the model to best fit an observation sequence [1].
In this paper, we have trained various HMM models for different malware families,
which correspond to the above mentioned problem 3. These trained HMM values,
which represent a set of data, give us values of 𝐴, 𝐵 which we use further for the
Convolutional Neural Network and Support Vector Machine. Please refer Section 2.4
for more information about Convolutional Neural Networks and Section 2.5 for more
information about Support Vector Machine.
The solution to the three HMM problems mentioned above can be solved as
follows.
Solution to Problem 1: In this, we find 𝑃 (𝑂|𝜆) with respect to the model
𝜆 = (𝐴, 𝐵, 𝜋)
which indicates the probability of an observation sequence at a time 𝑡 in a state 𝑞 𝑖 .
To calculate 𝑃 (𝑂|𝜆), we use the alpha pass or forward algorithm [1].

𝛼𝑡 (𝑖) = 𝑃 (𝑂0 , 𝑂1 , . . . , 𝑂𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡 = 𝑞𝑖 |𝜆)

𝑃 (𝑂|𝜆) =

𝑁
−1
∑︁
𝑖=0
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𝛼𝑇 −1 (𝑖)

(1)

(2)

Solution to Problem 2: The solution to problem 2 is achieved by the beta pass
or backward algorithm where our aim is to find the most likely state sequence. For
𝑖 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1 and 𝑡 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑇 − 1, we have [1]

𝛽𝑡 (𝑖) = 𝑃 (𝑂𝑡+1 , 𝑂𝑡+2 , . . . , 𝑂𝑇 −1 |𝑥𝑡 = 𝑞𝑖 , 𝜆)

(3)

Solution to Problem 3: In problem 3, our aim is to train a model such that it best
fits the observation sequence. We follow the Baum-Welch algorithm. In this, we start
by initializing the 𝐴, 𝐵 and 𝜋 matrix by random initialization and maintaining the
row stochastic nature of the matrix. The Baum-Welch algorithm can be summarized
as below [1]
1. Initialize the model
𝜆 = (𝐴, 𝐵, 𝜋)
2. Compute the values of 𝛼𝑡 (𝑖), 𝛽𝑡 (𝑖), 𝛾𝑡 (𝑖, 𝑗)
3. Reestimate the model
𝜆 = (𝐴, 𝐵, 𝜋)
as below
For 𝑖 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1, let

(4)

𝜋𝑖 = 𝛾0 (𝑖)
For 𝑖 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1 and 𝑗 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1, calculate

𝑎𝑖,𝑗 =

𝑇 −2
∑︁

⧸︂ ∑︁
𝑇 −2
𝛾𝑡 (𝑖, 𝑗)
𝛾𝑡 (𝑖)

𝑡=0

𝑡=0

13

(5)

For 𝑗 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1 and 𝑘 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑀 − 1, calculate

𝑏𝑗 (𝑘) =

∑︁

⧸︂ ∑︁
𝑇 −2
𝛾𝑡 (𝑗)
𝛾𝑡 (𝑗)

𝑡∈(0,1,...,𝑇 −2),𝑂𝑡 =𝑘

(6)

𝑡=0

4. If the value of 𝑃 (𝑂|𝜆) increases, go to step 2.

2.3

Deep Learning
Deep Learning or Deep Structured Learning or Hierarchical Learning is a subclass

of machine learning methods based on learning the representation of data [33]. The
learning of data representation can be either unsupervised or supervised. Deep learning
finds its applications in the field of speech recognition, image classification, audio
recognition and natural language processing. This is a section of machine learning
algorithms which use a combination of multiple layers of nonlinear units for processing
for the extraction of features and transformation [34]. In this, the input for each
layer is the output from the previous layer and the model learns various levels of
representation, each corresponding to varied levels of abstraction, hence forming a
hierarchy of concepts [34]. In this section, we discuss the basic components of deep
learning.
2.3.1

Loss Function

The loss function gives us a measure of the dissimilarity between the prediction
given by the algorithm and the actual label. Several cost functions can be used but
one of the most simple and commonly used in neural networks is the mean squared
error (MSE). The mean squared error can be defined as [4]

𝑚

)︁
1 (︁∑︁
2
||ℎ(𝑥𝑖 ) − 𝑦𝑖 ||
𝐿(𝑊, 𝑏) =
𝑚 𝑖=1
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(7)

where
• 𝑚 is the number of training examples
• 𝑥𝑖 is the 𝑖th training sample
• 𝑦𝑖 is the class label for the 𝑖th training sample
• ℎ(𝑥𝑖 ) is the prediction of the algorithm for the 𝑖th training sample
The main aim of the training phase is to find the values of weight and bias for
which we get a minimum value for the cost or loss function 𝐿 [4].
2.3.2

Gradient Descent Algorithm

This is an algorithm used to minimize the loss function as discussed in Section 2.3.1.
The gradient descent algorithm is as discussed below [4]:
1. In the neural network, we start with an initialization of the weight and bias.
The main step is to initialize all the parameters randomly since
(a) this helps in breaking the symmetry
(b) if that does not happen, all the parameters would start with similar values
and in turn, all the hidden layer units will learn the same function of the
input.
2. Iteration is repeated to update the weight and bias until we reach a minimum.
The selection of the correct learning rate (𝛼) is very crucial as it plays an
important role to control how big a step should be taken. In case 𝛼 is very large, it
can go beyond the minimum whereas if 𝛼 is very small, the gradient descent could be
slow [4]. Figure 3 demonstrates the effects of various different learning rates on the
loss function.
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Figure 3: Effects of Different Learning Rates [4]
2.3.3

Backpropagation

This is an algorithm which, with the use of gradient descent, finds its applications
in supervised learning of neural networks. The general concept behind backpropagation
is that if we have a training sample, it first runs a forward pass in which it calculates
all the activation and output values. Once the activation and output values are
calculated, an error term is computed for every node 𝑖 in layer 𝑙. This error term tells
the contribution of the node 𝑖 for causing errors in the output. In the case of an output
node, we can directly measure the error term by checking the difference between the
value of the true target and the value obtained using the network’s activation [4].
2.4

Convolutional Neural Network
A Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) is a feed forward neural network. CNNs

are made up of neurons and they have weights and bias which are learnt in the
training phase. It is currently the latest neural network architecture for the problem
of classification of images.
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In the case of CNN for image classification, it takes an image as the input,
it assigns learnable weights and biases to various objects in the image in order to
differentiate images. The pre-processing required in order to classify images using
CNN is very low in comparison to the various other algorithms for classification.
In earlier techniques, the filters were engineered by hand, but now CNNs have the
capability to learn these filters, if the model is trained well [35].
The various versions of the implementation of CNN can be generally described
by the below process [4]:
1. Consider the input image and convolve various small filters
2. Subsample this space
3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 till we have enough high level features
4. To the high level features, apply a standard feed forward neural network
CNNs are composed of three main components [35]:
1. Convolutional layer
2. Pooling layer
3. Fully connected layer
Figure 4 shows the basic architecture for the classification of images. The
Section 2.4.1 - 2.4.3 explains the three main components of CNN.
2.4.1

Convolutional Layer

This is the most important part of the CNN. It consists of a collection of kernels
which can be learnt and are convolved during the forward pass. This convolution
is done across the height and width of the input features, which in turn produces a
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Figure 4: CNN Architecture [5]
2-dimensional map of the kernel [4]. In short, a kernel is a set of a layer of weights in
which the size of the input is that of a small 2D patch while the output is in the form
of a single unit [4]. The convolution layers apply convolution operation to the input
and then pass the result to the next layer. The main aim of this layer is to learn the
representation of the input in the form of features.
This consists of various feature maps. Within the same feature map, every neuron
is used to get local characteristics of points in the previous layer, whereas for single
neurons, the extraction is local characteristics of same points in previous different
feature maps. To get a new feature, we take a learned kernel and convolve it with the
input feature maps, after which the results are passed to an activation function, which
is generally non-linear [36]. There are various kernels applying which we get different
feature maps [37]. The activation functions generally used are Tanh, Sigmoid and
Relu.
Figure 5 shows how convolution works. We take into account an image of size
5 × 5 pixels, as shown in the figure, where 255 represents white and 0 represents
black. Towards the center of the figure, a kernel has been defined of size 3 × 3 pixels,
where except one white set, all the others are 0. In this case, we get the output by
calculating the kernel for every possible position in the image.
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Figure 5: Convolution [4]
The stride determines if the kernel is convolved through all places. For example,
if the stride is 1, the output is the normal convolution, whereas if the stride is 2 the
number of convolutions reduce by half. The size of the output image after a kernel of
size 𝑍 convolves over an image 𝑁 with stride 𝑆 is given as [4]
output =
2.4.2

𝑁 −𝑍
+1
𝑆

(8)

Pooling Layer

This layer is helpful for down-sampling the data non-linearly, which is produced
from the convolution layers, i.e., decreasing the spatial resolution of the input layers [35].
Due to this, the time required for processing is reduced and also the scale of the
data can be handled by the computational resource. Pooling can be implemented by
various several non-linear functions, for example, maximum, minimum and average.
The most common pooling function is the maximum [4]. In max pooling, the image
is partitioned into several smaller rectangles, which do not occupy the same area.
Then for each small rectangular region the maximum value is presented as the output.
Figure 6 represents the concept of max pooling.
2.4.3

Fully Connected Layer

Generally, the classifier of CNN consists of one or several fully connected layers.
In this, the spatial information is not preserved. This performs classification based
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Figure 6: Max Pooling [4]
on the output which is a result of various convolution and pooling layers. The last
such layer results in an output layer [35]. In order to classify the images, the flattened
matrix is passed through a fully connected layer. For many cases of classification,
a well performed probability distribution of the outputs is generated in the case of
softmax regression.
2.4.4

Softmax

The softmax function finds the probability distribution of the event over 𝑛 various
events. Generally speaking, the function will calculate the probabilities of every target
class over all the possible target classes. After that, the probabilities which are
calculated would be helpful for finding out the target class for the given inputs [4].
2.5

Support Vector Machine (SVM)
One of the most popular and commonly used algorithm for classification problems

is SVM. It is also used for regression analysis. Since classification is a form of supervised
learning, we must assign labels to the dataset. In this, the algorithm aims to find an
optimal hyperplane in such a way that the hyperplane acts as a dividing parameter
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for the class labels, i.e., every data point on one side of the hyperplane belongs to one
class [38].
Figure 7 shows an optimal hyperplane. We can see from the figure the main aim
of the hyperplane is to maximize the margin, which means the distance between the
nearest data points of the different classes should be maximum.

Figure 7: Example of Optimal Hyperplane [6]
There are many kernels which can be used in SVM. The most commonly used
kernel is the linear kernel, but in cases where the training data is not easily linearly
separable, we have to use kernels like Radial Basis Function (RBF) or Gaussian.
Using the kernel, we can transform the data into a higher dimensional space [25].
Figure 8 shows how the training set is transformed into a higher dimensional space.
2.6

𝑘-Means Clustering
𝑘-Means Clustering is a form of unsupervised learning algorithm, where the data

is not labelled and the technique aims to find patterns in the data. The aim of this
algorithm is to group data having similar features. In the end, each cluster will
represent groups of similar data. The term 𝑘 refers to the number of clusters or groups
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Figure 8: Mapping Data to Higher Dimensionality [7]
in which the data has to be divided. A point is considered in any particular cluster
when the distance between that point and the cluster’s centroid is lesser than any
other centroid. Figure 9 shows how the data points are clustered into 3 different
clusters.

Figure 9: 𝑘-Means Clustering [8]

2.7

Related Work
Many people have worked on classifying samples into malware or benign. Research

is also done to classify a sample as binary or malware using HMMs [39]. Also, some
research is done on clustering malware families using HMM. This section gives an
overview of the work previously done in this domain.
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2.7.1

Behavior Based Malware Detection

Many antiviruses used today identify malware based on the signature of the
malware [40]. But such a method proves less helpful as the detection happens after
the malware has caused the damage and also the malware signature is stored in the
database maintaining the known malware signature [19]. Most methods deal with
static features for malware detection but in this case in order to detect the malware,
the dynamic behavior of the files is observed. This dynamic behavior can be observed
by running the executable in a virtual environment. The virtual environment permits
the user to follow the program execution step by step. The approach used in [41],
uses machine learning techniques on the features extracted from the dynamic analysis
of the malware samples. Since it is a machine learning based approach, the research
in [41] has 2 phases, the training phase and the testing phase. The training phase
comprises of the data samples being monitored for behavioral patterns. In order to
observe the behavioral patterns, the samples (both benign and malware) are sent
via an automatic dynamic analysis tool [41] that executes the samples in a virtual
environment.
Once the file is run through the virtual environment, a report showing the behavior
of the input file is generated which are then further processed for the selection of
features. In this step, the most important characteristics are selected which are
then stored as vectors. Next in this research [41], machine learning techniques are
applied to these feature vectors for the classification of malware samples from benign.
This research [41] presents a comparison of the five different classification algorithms
such as Naive Baye’s, 𝑘-Nearest Neighbours, Decision Tress, SVM and Multilayer
Perceptron neural network and compares the performance of these five classifiers.
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2.7.2

Malware Classification Using Structured Control Flow

Many techniques have been used for malware classification and in the research
paper [42] the authors have proposed an approach using control flow. The control flow
depicts the flow of the program, i.e., the execution path which the program will follow.
Control information appears in two forms. The call graph shows the inter-procedural
flow of control while the intra-procedural control flow is depicted as a series of control
flow graphs which have a single graph per procedure [42].
The research paper in [42] shows that the malware can be characterized by the
control flow and the authors have suggested a classification system of malware which
uses approximate matching of the control flow graphs [42]. The calculation of the
string edit distances can be done by the edit distance between the structured graphs
of the malware in the database and the control flow signatures [42]. A threshold is
decided by the author, above which a sample can be labeled as a malware, otherwise
it is a benign. In cases of metamorphic malware, the control flow does not change
much. Hence using the research in [42], it is possible to identify variations of the
malware, i.e., in cases of metamorphic malware.
2.7.3

Hidden Markov Model Based Malware Families Detection

Attempts have been made in previous researches to cluster similar malware
families based on HMM results. The approach used in [19] is that HMM models
for different malware families were run for different compilers and then these scores
were used as dimensions for clustering the malware families. In this, HMM models
were created for 7 cases which included 4 compilers, hand-written assembly, virus
construction kit and for metamorphic code [19]. The author performed 5-fold cross
validation and created models for 𝑁 varying from 2 to 6. Every malware sample is
scored against each of the trained models in the 7 cases and then the author considered
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the average score for all the models is taken as the final score for that case [19]. Hence
each sample is depicted as a 7-tuple score which are provided to the 𝑘-means clustering
algorithm.
2.7.4

Malware Classification Using Images

Many techniques have been applied for the purpose of classification of malware.
People have tried to show the malware as an image in order to classify them. In
the research paper in [43], the authors have tried to follow a similar approach. They
have converted the malware samples into images and then have applied classification
algorithms to classify the samples to various families.
The idea behind this research is that it is possible to depict a malware executable
as a binary string of zeros and ones and the resulting vector can be treated as a matrix
and viewed as an image [43]. The malware binary is read as a vector of 8-bit unsigned
integers and later organized into a 2D array which can be then visualized as a gray
scale image [43]. The size of image can vary based on the file size over a range of file
sizes. The malware images are distinguished based on the texture of the image, and
the primary feature used to analyze textures is GIST descriptors [44] [45]. Then these
previous authors apply 𝑘-Nearest Neighbors (kNN) classifier and performed various
experiments for varying values of 𝑘. This research focuses on similar experiments for
malware families.
2.8

Tools
This section talks about the tools used for extracting opcode sequences from

malware files. The first subsection talks about IDA and the second subsection talks
about objdump.
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2.8.1

IDA

IDA stands for Interactive Disassembler which is a disassembler which converts
machine executable code to assembly language source code. IDA does code analysis
automatically. It also uses information about API calls and refers between sections
of code [46]. The formats supported by IDA include a variety of executable formats
across various platforms and processors. The output is represented in the form of a
flow graph or text file which outlines the basic structure of the code. Figure 10 shows
how a disassembled file looks like in IDA. This snapshot is for a sample of the Zbot
family.

Figure 10: IDA
2.8.2

Objdump

This is a command line program that displays information about object files on
operating systems such as Linux. In our case, it is used to disassemble an executable
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file and view it assembly form. It is a part of the GNU Binutils [2]. The command
used for disassembling a file is
objdump -Mintel -D <file_name>
The other possible operations of the objdump command are listed in Table 2 [2].
Argument

Description

a
b bfdname
d
D
f
h
i
section
l
m
r
R
s
t
T

archive-headers
target=bfdname
disassemble
disassemble-all
file-headers
section-headers
info
section
line-numbers
machine
reloc
dynamic-reloc
full-contents
syms
dynamic-syms

Table 2: Possible Operations of Objdump [2]
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CHAPTER 3
Implementation
This chapter covers the details of the implementation of the project. The first
section, Section 3.1 gives an overview of the dataset. Next, the Section 3.2 gives a
detailed description about the extraction of features and generating an observation
sequence to feed the model. The next section, Section 3.3 gives a description of
training the HMMs. The last section, Section 3.4 gives a detailed explanation about
how the HMM values are classified, along with the specifications and details about
the methods.
3.1

Dataset
This project requires a huge number of malware samples since each HMM model

is trained on an observation sequence of 50,000 symbols. The dataset [47] that I used
for experimentation in this project is very large, containing nearly 1TB worth of data.
It comprises of nearly 460,000 malware binaries belonging to various malware families.
The total number of malware families present in this dataset is 2900. All the malware
samples have either the dll (dynamic link library) or exe (executable) format. The
dataset also contains csv (comma separated value) files which hold information about
the malware files. For every malware sample, we know what family it belongs to, the
category of the malware (whether it is virus or trojan, please refer Section 2) and how
severe the attack of that malware could be. Some of the major malware families in
the dataset include Zbot, Bancos, Bho, Alureon, Winwebsec, Vundo, Adload, Vobfus
and so on. Figure 11 shows a snapshot of the csv file which holds all this data.
Table 3 depicts the count of the samples used for training the HMM. Below are
the malware families which we are using for our experimentations
• Zbot belongs to a family of trojans. This malware focuses on stealing financial
and confidential information from the target systems. This malware targets the
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Figure 11: Snapshot of the Metadata
Windows operating system. This enters by the websites which are hacked or
usually via spam emails [48].
• The family Adload also belongs to the family of trojans. It is capable of attacking
the target system by opening a backdoor so that it can download and install the
potentially unwanted programs or adware. This malware gathers the information
of the target system and send them to a remote location [49].
Malware Family

Count

Zbot
Adload

740
304

Table 3: Number of Samples Used for Training the HMM

3.2

Feature Engineering
This section describes the two main steps for the generation of features to give

to the HMM model. We have used opcodes as the means to represent our malware
samples. The extraction of opcodes serves as one of the key steps in the experiments
for this project. The below Section 3.2.1 highlights the important steps and process
followed for the extraction of opcodes. In the next Section 3.2.2, we discuss how we
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have used the opcodes as features for training the Hidden Markov Models, which then
we further use for the classification of malware samples.
3.2.1

Opcode Extraction

The initial approach to extract the opcodes was to use the free version of the
disassembler IDA. A detailed description about the same is covered in Section 2.8.
But the problem with using the free version of IDA was that each malware sample had
to be opened manually with IDA, one at a time. The opcodes which were generated
would have to be then copied to a text file, after which the later steps could be carried
out. But this would take a lot of time since it was manually impossible to do this for
1000 files. Purchasing the full version of IDA was very expensive. Hence, we came up
with another solution for the same. We wrote a script which extracted the opcodes
for us and generated a text file for the same. The below steps were followed for the
extraction of the opcodes.
1. The dataset was divided into folders, each folder having the malware samples of
a particular family.
2. A Virtual Machine was setup, as mentioned in Section 4.1, for running the script
to extract the opcodes.
3. Transfer the scripts and the samples of a particular family for which the opcodes
have to be extracted.
4. On the virtual machine, run the script which would output a shell script.
5. Give access to the script to be executed by any user and run the shell script.
The shell script converts the malware samples into opcode sequences using
the objdump command (please refer Section 2.8.2). The malware samples are
converted into a file with extension opcecho_opcodes.
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6. Then run another pythons script which converts the .opcecho_opcodes files to
a text file. We now have each of the extracted opcodes in their respective text
files.
7. Copy back the text files from the virtual machine to the host machine. Merge
all the files into a single file to get a long list of opcodes for that family.
3.2.2

Opcode as Features

We now have the opcodes extracted from the malware exe or dll. Our next step
is to convert the opcodes in a way that it can be used as features for the HMM. The
approach we have followed to convert the opcodes to the observation sequence is as
follows:
1. From all the opcode files, for all families, get the top 25 occurring opcodes.
2. Map the 25 most occurring opcodes to their respective number, as mentioned
below, and group the rest of them as Others.
Table 4 shows a list of the top 25 opcodes along with the mappings used to
convert them to an observation sequence. Figure 12 is a snapshot of a subset of the
Zbot family. Figure 12a shows the opcodes which are extracted from the malware
samples and Figure 12b shows the corresponding numeric representation which are
used as features for the HMM.
3.3

Training the HMM
Multiple experiments were run for this project. All the experiments follow the

same steps, but the observation sequence for each model is changed. Each observation
sequence is picked up from various malware families, such as Zbot and Adload. Every
HMM is trained on a sequence of opcodes, extracted as described in Section 3.2.
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Table 4: Opcode Mapping
MOV
ADD
SUB
PUSH
ADC
JNZ
INC
JMP
LEA
CMP
CALL
JZ
JB
OR
POP
ALIGN
JNB
XOR
JA
XCHG
AND
DEC
SHL
PUSHA
POPA
Others

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

We have trained several HMMs for each malware family from the dataset. Every
HMM is trained for an observation sequence of length 𝑇 = 50, 000 opcode symbols.
We have trained with 𝑀 = 26 and the value of 𝑁 varying from 2 to 26. The number
of iterations has been set to 1000 in the cases when 𝑁 = 2, 3, 5, 10. But for 𝑁 = 26,
the number of iterations is set to 200. The initialization of the 𝐴, 𝐵 and 𝜋 matrices is
done by random values, maintaining the row stochastic nature of each of the matrices.
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(a) Extracted Opcodes

(b) Corresponding Numeric Representation

Figure 12: Snapshot of the Zbot Family
These set of experiments correspond to the problem 3 as defined in Section 2.2.3.1.
The HMM is trained by the EM algorithm [50] which consists of numerous
iterations. Every iteration has one estimate and one maximize step. The entire process
is repeated multiple times or when the log likelihood measure becomes constant,
indicating that the model has converged. The maximize step aligns each observation
vector with a state in the model and a log likelihood value is maximized. The estimate
step estimates the parameters of a statistical model for the aligned vectors and the
state transition probabilities, for every state. In the next iteration, the maximize step
runs again with the updated models.
3.4

Classification of Malware
Once we have the results from training the HMM, we have to find some way

to classify the HMM results into different malware families. This is done using the
below two methods. Section 3.4.1 covers the classification of HMM results using
Convolutional Neural Networks. Section 3.4.2 explains how the classification of the
HMM results is done using Support Vector Machine.
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3.4.1

Convolutional Neural Networks

In this method, we merge the 𝐴 and 𝐵 matrices from the HMM results and
convert the merged matrix to an image using the PIL library in Python. In case for
𝑁 = 2, we have the dimensions of the 𝐴 matrix as 2 × 2 and the dimensions of the 𝐵
matrix as 2 × 26. Hence the dimension of the merged matrix is 2 × 28, for which we
create the image. Figure 13 shows a generated image of the merged matrix for the
case 𝑁 = 2. The malware sample belonged to the Zbot family. The 𝐴 and 𝐵 matrices
from which Figure 13 was generated are
⎡

0.1070
⎢ 0.0569
⎢
⎢ 0.0230
⎢
⎢ 0.0682
⎢
⎢ 0.0354
⎢
⎢ 0.0000
⎢
⎢ 0.0352
⎢
⎢0.01517
⎢
⎢ 0.0041
⎢
⎢ 0.0230
⎢
⎢ 0.0050
⎢
⎢ 0.0000
⎢
[︂
]︂
⎢ 0.0061
0.5050 0.4950
𝑇
𝐴=
and 𝐵 = ⎢
⎢ 0.0397
0.5476 0.4524
⎢
⎢ 0.0435
⎢
⎢ 0.0000
⎢
⎢ 0.0000
⎢
⎢ 0.0309
⎢
⎢ 0.0040
⎢
⎢ 0.0226
⎢
⎢ 0.0293
⎢
⎢ 0.0298
⎢
⎢ 0.0033
⎢
⎢ 0.0078
⎢
⎣ 0.0042
0.4058

⎤
0.1024
0.0658⎥
⎥
0.0223⎥
⎥
0.0775⎥
⎥
0.0350⎥
⎥
0.0000⎥
⎥
0.0422⎥
⎥
0.0167⎥
⎥
0.0050⎥
⎥
0.0311⎥
⎥
0.0328⎥
⎥
0.0000⎥
⎥
0.0058⎥
⎥
0.0410⎥
⎥
0.0438⎥
⎥
0.0000⎥
⎥
0.0000⎥
⎥
0.0309⎥
⎥
0.0033⎥
⎥
0.0224⎥
⎥
0.0281⎥
⎥
0.0318⎥
⎥
0.0022⎥
⎥
0.0078⎥
⎥
0.0042⎦
0.3477

Figure 14 shows the HMM matrices visualized for the Adload family in the case
where 𝑁 = 2 and the dimension of the merged matrix 2 × 28. Figure 15 shows the
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HMM matrices visualized for the Adload family in the case where 𝑁 = 26 and the
dimension of the merged matrix 26 × 52.

Figure 13: Zbot Malware

Figure 14: Adload Malware

Figure 15: Adload Malware
Below listed are the specifications for the CNN used. The CNN used is from the
keras module in python. We have used a sequential 2 dimensional CNN model which
performs spatial convolution over images. Below mentioned is the architecture and
specification details for the CNN used:
1. Input layer, which has the dimensions based on the images generated by the
HMM. If the value of 𝑁 used for training the HMM is 2, then we use an input
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layer of size 2 × 28 whereas when we use the value of 𝑁 = 26 for the HMM, we
use an input layer of 26 × 52.
2. Convolutional layer (input_shape/2) filter maps of size 2 × 2 with the activation
function as relu (Rectified Linear Unit)
3. Convolutional layer (input_shape/2) filter maps of size 2 × 2 with the activation
function as relu)
4. Convolutional layer (input_shape/2) filter maps of size 2 × 2 with the activation
function as relu)
5. Convolutional layer (input_shape/2) filter maps of size 2 × 2 with the activation
function as relu)
6. Flatten layer which would remove all the dimensions of the matrix except for 1
7. Dense layer with dimensionality of the output space as 30 and activation function
relu
8. Dense layer with dimensionality of the output space as 1 and activation function
sigmoid
The number of layers is varied between 2 and 4 for experimentation purpose.
3.4.2

Support Vector Machine (SVM)

After running HMMs for various different families, we get the 𝐴, 𝐵 and 𝜋 matrix.
We merge the 𝐴 and 𝐵 matrices from the HMM results and flatten the matrix to
produce a single row of values. This is then used as a feature vector for the SVM
algorithm. The SVM algorithm is used from the sklearn library in Python with a
linear kernel. The SVM algorithm (please refer Section 2.5) will be used to classify
the HMM models into different malware families.
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In case for 𝑁 = 2, we have the dimensions of the 𝐴 matrix as 2 × 2 and the
dimensions of the 𝐵 matrix as 2 × 26. After merging we get a matrix of size 2 × 28,
which is then flattened to get a matrix of size 1 × 56 for every HMM.
For example, if 𝐴 matrix is
and 𝐵 matrix is

[︂
]︂
𝑎11 𝑎12
𝑎21 𝑎22

[︂
]︂
𝑏11 𝑏12 𝑏13 . . . 𝑏126
𝑏21 𝑏22 𝑏23 . . . 𝑏226

Once we merge these two matrices and flatten it we get,
[︀
]︀
𝑎11 𝑎12 𝑏11 . . . 𝑏126 𝑎21 𝑎22 𝑏21 . . . 𝑏226
3.5

Clustering of Malware
Once we have the results from training the HMM, we experiment with 𝑘-means

clustering to cluster the different malware models into their respective families. We
have the points for clustering from the 𝐴 and 𝐵 matrix obtained by training the
several HMMs for each malware family. The feature vector is constructed as described
in Section 3.4.2 after which we have experimented for various values of 𝑘.
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CHAPTER 4
Experiments
In this chapter, we have specified the setup and results of the experiments of the
project. The setup section covers the configurations and specifications of the host
and guest machine. The second section covers the results and discussions about the
results.
4.1

Setup
In this we have set up a virtual machine using Oracle VirtualBox. The virtual

machine is used for generating the opcodes from the malware executables. The
extraction of opcodes is done on the guest machine. Running the HMMs and classifying
the malware families is done on the host machine. Below are the specifications for the
guest and the host machine.
Host Machine
Operating System
Model
Processor
Software
RAM

Mac OS
MacBook Pro
2GHz Intel Core i5
Version 10.12.6
8GB

Table 5: Specifications of the Host Machine

Guest Machine
Operating System
Software
System Type

Ubuntu 14.04.5 LTS
Oracle VirtualBox version 5.2.8
64 bit OS

Table 6: Specifications of the Guest Machine
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4.2

Results
In this section, we discuss the results obtained and the accuracy for various cases.

We also have the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve for each of the cases.
We have done a 70-30 split to the trained HMM models and then performed the steps
as discussed in Section 3.4. The families used in the experiments are Zbot and Adload.
The main purpose of our experiments is to compare the performance of CNN
and SVM in distinguishing malware families. Also, the purpose of our experiments
is to find the best value of 𝑁 and the best value of the hyperparameters (for CNN)
which give us the maximum value of accuracy in classifying the malware samples to
their respective families. We start by training several HMMs for various malware
families. We train 1000 HMMs for each malware family for 𝑁 = 2, and 500 HMMs
with 𝑁 = 3 and 𝑁 = 5 and, finally, 400 HMMs with 𝑁 = 10 and 𝑁 = 26. Once we
have trained the HMMs, based on the values of the 𝐴 and 𝐵 matrix, we apply deep
learning techniques such as CNN (refer Section 2.4) and machine learning techniques
such as SVM (refer Section 2.5), in order to classify the trained HMM models into
the various malware families. This is similar to applying machine learning on top
of machine learning since we are applying machine learning on the trained HMM
matrices, which are also obtained by applying a machine learning technique(HMM).
In order to use the trained HMM values for CNN, we merge the 𝐴 and 𝐵 matrix
and convert it into an image. Then we apply CNN as an image classifier since we
have converted the trained HMM values, which in turn means the malware samples
from a family, to images. Next, to apply SVM, we merge the 𝐴 and 𝐵 matrices and
flatten it, after which we apply SVM for classification of samples into various malware
families. Also, ROC curves for the SVM classifier are generated. The region under
the ROC curve gives an idea about how good the classifier is [51].
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4.2.1

Classification of Malware Trained HMMs using CNN

We experimented with various values of 𝑁 for the HMM and also by changing
the hyperparameters of the CNN model. The specifications of HMM are as given in
Table 7. These specifications are for the case of 𝑁 = 2, 3, 5, 10. The specifications of
HMM for the case of 𝑁 = 26 are as given in Table 8.
𝑀
𝑇
Iterations

26
50000
1000

Table 7: HMM Specifications for 𝑁 = 2, 3, 5, 10

𝑀
𝑇
Iterations

26
50000
200

Table 8: HMM Specifications for 𝑁 = 26

Table 9 gives a list of the experiments, for the HMM specifications mentioned in
Table 7, along with the specifications of the hyperparameters for CNN and the obtained
accuracy for each case. Table 10 gives a list of the experiments, for the HMM specifications mentioned in Table 8, along with the specifications of the hyperparameters
for CNN and the obtained accuracy for each case.
Figure 16 shows the confusion matrix for the case 𝑁 = 3, where the number of
epochs for training is set to 100, the steps per epoch is set to 5 and the number of
layers is 4. Figure 17 shows the confusion matrix for the case 𝑁 = 5, where the epochs
run is 100, the steps ran per epoch is set to 10 and the number of layers is 4. Figure
18 shows the confusion matrix for the case 𝑁 = 10, where the hyperparameters of the
CNN include the number of epochs being set to 10, the steps per epoch set as 5, and
the number of layers is set to 4.
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Number
of images
used
for
training
1400
1400
1400
1400
700
700
700
700
700
700
700
700
700
700
560
560
560
560

Number
of images
used
for
testing
600
600
600
600
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
240
240
240
240

Number of
states in
HMM

Number of
epochs

Number of
layers

Steps per
epoch

Accuracy

2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
5
5
5
5
5
5
10
10
10
10

10
10
100
100
10
10
100
100
10
10
10
100
100
100
10
10
100
100

2
4
2
4
2
4
2
4
2
4
4
2
4
4
2
4
2
4

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
10
5
5
10
5
5
5
5

0.52
0.52
0.67
0.72
0.62
0.72
0.90
0.90
0.74
0.80
0.78
0.80
0.82
0.82
0.86
0.72
0.83
0.76

Table 9: Results for CNN for 2 families
Number
of images
used
for
training
560
560
560
560
560

Number
of images
used
for
testing
240
240
240
240
240

Number of
states in
HMM

Number of
epochs

Number of
layers

Steps per
epoch

Accuracy

26
26
26
26
26

10
10
100
100
200

2
4
2
4
4

5
5
5
5
5

0.55
0.84
0.87
0.91
0.87

Table 10: Results for CNN for 2 families
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Figure 16: Confusion matrix for 𝑁 = 3

Figure 17: Confusion matrix for 𝑁 = 5
Based on the experiments and the results shown in Tables 9 and 10, we can say
that we get the highest accuracy of 0.91, in the case where we train the HMM for
𝑁 = 26 and with the specifications as mentioned in Table 8. The CNN parameters
include the number of epochs assigned as 100, the steps per epoch assigned as 5 and
the number of layers is fixed at 4. Also, we can say that in the case where we train
the HMM for 𝑁 = 3 and with the specifications as mentioned in Table 7, we get
almost the same result (the value of accuracy as 0.90) as in the previous case. The
CNN parameters include the number of epochs being set to 100, the steps per epoch
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Figure 18: Confusion matrix for 𝑁 = 10
being set at 5 and the number of layers is set at 4.
Computations for the case of 𝑁 = 3 is lesser as compared to the case of 𝑁 = 26.
Also, the training for 𝑁 = 3 will take lesser time as compared to the case of 𝑁 = 26.
Even though the number of states is significantly larger in the case of 𝑁 = 26, we do
not get any significant increase in the accuracy from the 𝑁 = 3 case. Hence we can
say that the HMM training of 𝑁 = 3 along with the CNN parameters as number of
epochs being set to 100, the steps ran per epoch set as 5 and the number of layers
assigned to 4 works best for our case to distinguish between malware families.
In the case of 𝑁 = 2, we see very low values of accuracy ranging from 0.52 to
0.72, even when the number of training samples is 1400 from both the classes. In
the case of 𝑁 = 3, the lowest accuracy we see is 0.62. In the case of 𝑁 = 5, we see
accuracy value ranging from 0.74 to 0.82, even when the number of training samples
is 1400 from both the classes. In the case of 𝑁 = 10, we see better accuracy results as
compared to the case of 𝑁 = 2, 5, ranging from 0.72 to 0.86, even when the number
of training samples is reduced to 560 from both the classes. In the case of 𝑁 = 26,
the lowest accuracy we see is 0.55.
In general, we see that even though for the value of 𝑁 = 2, we train with the
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maximum number of HMMs we get the lowest accuracy values. The explanation for
such low accuracy results could be attributed to the fact that since the dimension of
the 𝐴 and 𝐵 matrix is 2 × 2 and 2 × 26, a lesser essence of the malware family could
be captured as compared to when the value of 𝑁 is increased. Hence in the case for
𝑁 = 26, even with lesser number of HMMs, we get a very good accuracy value.
We extended our research to a total of 10 families. In addition to Adload and
Zbot, we included the families Bancos, Bho, Injector, Obfuscator, Renos, Vbinject,
Vobfus and Winwebsec. The experimentations for 10 families were carried out with
𝑁 = 3 since that value of 𝑁 was giving us the best accuracy value when there were
2 families. We trained 500 HMMs per malware family for all 10 families. Table 11
gives a summary of the results obtained when all 10 families were considered for the
experiments. As we can see from the Table 11, the accuracy does not change much
even when the number of epochs is significantly changed from 1000 to 5000.
Number of
epochs

Number of
layers

Steps per
epoch

Accuracy

1000
5000

4
4

5
5

0.26
0.21

Model
Training
Accuracy
0.38
0.40

Table 11: Results for CNN for 10 families

4.2.2

Classification of Malware Trained HMMs using SVM

We experimented with various values of 𝑁 for the HMM and trained different
SVM models for each value of 𝑁 . The specifications of HMM are as given in Table
7. These specifications are for the case of 𝑁 = 2, 3, 5, 10. The specifications of HMM
for the case of 𝑁 = 26 are as given in Table 8. After the matrices are merged and
flattened, the feature vectors were normalized in order to eliminate any 0 values and
the data was pre-processed to label the Adload family as 0 and the Zbot family as 1.
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Then we trained the SVM models for different values of 𝑁 .
Number
of
HMMs used for
training
1400
700
700
560
560

Number
of
HMMs used for
testing
600
300
300
240
240

𝑁

Accuracy

2
3
5
10
26

0.97
0.99
0.96
0.94
0.98

Table 12: Results for SVM for 2 families

As we can see from Table 12, in the case of SVM, the accuracy is best in the case
for 𝑁 = 3 (0.99) whereas the least accuracy is observed in the case of 𝑁 = 10. We see
that the value of accuracy is highest for the cases of 𝑁 = 3 and 𝑁 = 26. But since
the training of HMMs for 𝑁 = 26 would require a huge amount of time, we would
prefer the case of 𝑁 = 3.
As in CNN, we extended our research to a total of 10 families. In addition to
Adload and Zbot, we included the families Bancos, Bho, Injector, Obfuscator, Renos,
Vbinject, Vobfus and Winwebsec. The experimentations for 10 families were carried
out with 𝑁 = 3 since that value of 𝑁 was giving us the best accuracy value when there
were 2 families. The accuracy we obtained from increasing the number of families to
10 was 0.61. Figure 19 shows the ROC curves for all the 10 families. We can say that
our SVM classifier is able to identify class 0 (Adload) and class 7 (Vobfus) the best
whereas it detects class 1 (Bancos) the worst.
We also see that as we kept adding the malware families, the accuracy dropped.
Figure 20 shows the drop in accuracy level as the families were added. At each step,
the average of the accuracy values is displayed for that particular number of families,
chosen randomly.
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Figure 19: ROC for 10 families
4.2.3

Comparison of CNN and SVM

From the results observed in Tables 9, 10 and 12, we can say that SVM performs
better than CNN in our case for the classification of malware into families. Even
when the reserach was extended for 10 families, SVM proved to be a better choice as
compared to CNN as the accuracy value we obtained from SVM was much higher
than what we achieved in CNN. SVM has a maximum accuracy of 0.99 (when 𝑁 = 3)
and CNN has a maximum accuracy (optimal) of 0.90 (when 𝑁 = 3), in the case of
2 families. Also, CNN gives an accuracy of 0.91 when 𝑁 = 26, but that involves a
lot of time and computation in the training phase. In comparison to CNN and SVM,
we could say that SVM proves to be a better technique to classify the trained HMM
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Figure 20: Graph for Dropping Accuracy Values
models as it gives a higher value of accuracy while consuming lesser computation
power. Since CNN works on a multi layered structure, it takes a lot of time and
computation resources to train the neural network as compared to a simpler, yet
efficient machine learning method as SVM. Figure 21 shows a graph of the comparison
of the accuracy values between CNN (highest accuracy value in each case) and SVM.
4.2.4

Clustering of Malware Trained HMMs

We carried out experimentations for 𝑘-means clustering for 𝑁 = 3 since it
was giving us the best accuracy in cases of CNN and SVM. When we applied 𝑘means clustering for 2 families (Adload and Zbot), the accuracy was 0.91. But when
we extended our experimentations to 10 families, the accuracy reduced drastically.
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Figure 21: Accuracy Comparison for CNN and SVM
Although the accuracy is less, an interesting observation for 10 families came to light,
i.e., the families of the same malware type were being grouped together. For example:
HMM models of the families Adload, Bancos, Bho, came together as they are all
types of Trojans. Another example was that HMM models of the families Injector,
Obfuscator came together as they are all types of VirTool.
4.2.5

Importance of Classification

The classification of malware samples into their respective families is very important because if we are able to classify new malware, we get a better and more
accurate way to remove those malware and also a faster way to detect those malware
since the malware can be removed using the similar technique as the family to which
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it is classified to. Also, we would be able to identify the functionality and how the
malware relates to other malware samples [19].
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusion and Future Work
In this project, we carried out various experiments to determine ways in which
we can classify different malware families. We worked with two different families:
Zbot and Adload. The description of the different malware families is given in Section
3.1. The total number of samples which we used was 1000. We also saw the results of
the comparison between the two methods (CNN and SVM). Please refer Section 4.2.3
for the same.
This project was twofold and took machine learning on another level. This is
mainly because in this project, we did not follow an approach where we run HMMs
and consider a threshold value to divide the various malware families. Instead we
applied machine learning on the results which we obtained from running the HMM,
i.e., it is like applying machine learning on top of machine learning.
In this project, we first ran several HMMs, ranging upto 1000 for each malware
family. Then we had two approaches:
• We converted the trained HMM results into an image and ran CNN to classify
images. This means we were classifying malware samples into their respective
malware families.
• We flattened the matrix obtained from the trained HMM results and applied
SVM on them with the intention of classifying malware samples into their
particular families.
Various experiments were performed where we changed the value of 𝑁 to 2,3,5,10
and 26. CNN (0.90) performed best in the case of 𝑁 = 3 and similar results were
observed in the case of SVM (0.99) also. From our experimentation, we observe that
SVM performs better as compared to CNN. The test set consists of trained HMM
samples from various families. Hence, we get to know the behavior of various malware
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families. This is helpful in cases of detecting zero-day malware and will speed up the
process of unseen malware detection. It is important to classify zero-day malware into
similar families since the detection method which would be used for the new malware
sample would be similar to the one used for the existing family. The results showed
that HMM in combination with SVM would serve as a great tool to identify zero-day
malware and classify them into a malware family matching the known families.
In the case of our project, we use opcodes sequences as the input to our HMM
model. The input to the CNN are the images which are generated from the matrices
of the HMM and the input to the SVM is the flattened matrix from the training of
HMM.
In this project, we have used opcodes as the observation sequence for the HMM.
We can look into exploring features such as n-grams or call graph sequences or control
flows for future experiments.
In this project, we used two malware families for our experimentation: Zbot and
Adload. Along with these two, we can use various other malware families also for
experimentation in the future.
An interesting approach which could be explored in the future would be using
Profile Hidden Markov Models (PHMM) instead of HMM and then applying CNN or
SVM to classify the malware samples.
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